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Credit Ratings With Endogenous Assets
Abstract
The market prices of securities are heavily dependent on their credit ratings, which can in turn influence the
issuers' incentives to invest in asset generation, resulting in inefficiencies. We provide a model with a strategic
credit rating agency (CRA) and issuers with endogenous set of assets. Specifically, we consider two ways by
which issuers generate assets: (1) bundling assets into securities of varying qualities (securitization) (2)
investing in projects funded by issuing corporate bonds (investment). We then analyze the equilibrium of
these models and derive the conditions under which ratings can result in over or under investments. Next, we
perform comparative statics analysis on the impact of market and macro factors on inefficiency by way of
influencing credit ratings. Finally, we show that how ratings models with endogenous assets can explain
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ABSTRACT
CREDIT RATINGS WITH ENDOGENOUS ASSETS
Ali Aram
Bilge Yilmaz
The market prices of securities are heavily dependent on their credit ratings, which can in
turn influence the issuers’ incentives to invest in asset generation, resulting in inefficiencies.
We provide a model with a strategic credit rating agency (CRA) and issuers with endoge-
nous set of assets. Specifically, we consider two ways by which issuers generate assets: (1)
bundling assets into securities of varying qualities (securitization) (2) investing in projects
funded by issuing corporate bonds (investment). We then analyze the equilibrium of these
models and derive the conditions under which ratings can result in over or under invest-
ments. Next, we perform comparative statics analysis on the impact of market and macro
factors on inefficiency by way of influencing credit ratings. Finally, we show that how ratings
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CHAPTER 1 : Credit Ratings with Issuers’ Access to Securitization
1.1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis drew attention to the role of information intermediaries and
their performances, from credit ratings to financial stress tests. Researchers have explored
multiple sources of friction in intermediaries’ ability to provide information, their incentives
to do so truthfully, and their role in improving efficiency and providing risk sharing in
the market. Credit rating literature have attributed inflated ratings particularly in asset
backed securities, prior to, and their failure after the crash, to a slew of factors including, but
not limited to, competition among CRAs, rating shopping, asset complexity, sophisticated
versus naive investors, business cycles, reputation concerns, and regulations.
A common feature in the existing theoretical models of credit ratings is that the set of
assets for which issuers seek ratings is exogenous. In this paper, we examine credit ratings
in a framework in which issuers are able to tailor the composition of their asset portfolios to
take advantage of the ratings offered by the CRA, a feature of markets offering securitized
instruments, and as we will argue, a key determining factor of rating performance and
efficiency.
The market in our model consists of issuers, investors, and a single CRA. Issuers are endowed
with assets of differing values, known privately, which they would sell to the uninformed
investors at the highest price. Ratings allow issuers to mitigate the information asymmetry
by signaling the value of their assets to investors. The rating system consists of an infor-
mation structure and a fee designed by the CRA with the goal of maximizing the total fee
collected.
Our setup builds on the previous works by Lizzeri (1999) and Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013),
by introducing two new features. First we assume that in addition to their endowment
assets, issuers have access to a costly technology that consists of two bits: 1) A production
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bit that allows issuers to produce new assets and 2) a securitizaton bit that enables issuers
to combine their endowment assets and the newly produced asset in varying proportions
to generate new securities pf varying qualities. By utilizing the technology, an issuers is
essentially able to select the asset qualities offered in its portfolios of issues.
Second, in our model, issuers and the CRA split the gains from trade of the assets in
the market. In comparison, the intermediary in Lizzeri’s and the CRA in Kartasheva and
Yilmaz’s extract all the trade surplus. Whereas the manner in which the surplus is split
in models with exogenous pool of assets is in general irrelevant to the their main results,
we show that with endogenously determined asset compositions, the degree by which the
CRA is able to extract trade surplus critically affects ratings performance, the issuers’
composition of assets, and the economy’s efficiency.
By combining the above features and solving for the equilibrium, we can examine informa-
tion disclosure by the CRA, how it is affected by the extent of issuers access to securitization,
and what the overall impact on efficiency is. Further, we perform comparative statics on
a number of market parameters and their influence on ratings performance and efficiency.
Our main results are the following.
Our first result is that in equilibrium all gains from trade are realized and the ratings are
informative but noisy and inflated, leading to under-pricing of high quality and over-pricing
of low quality assets. We also show that in equilibrium, some issuers would utilize the
technology to generate securities that differ in quality from their endowment assets, even
if the cost of the technology exceeds the value of the asset it produces. The reason that
inefficient investment in the technology is possible is the fact that equilibrium ratings are
noisy and induce over pricing of some assets. An issuer can take advantage by constructing
securities that replicate the qualities of said assets. We argue that this mechanism can
partially explain the over issuance of sub prime mortgages prior to the financial crisis.
Our next result is that credit ratings does not guarantee the efficient outcome, despite the
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fact that they ensure all gains from trade are realized. The reason is that with endogenous
asset composition, ratings some times do induce inefficient investment, which causes the
equilibrium total surplus fall short of the first best solution. We derive the most efficient
outcome possible in any equilibrium, and show that a reduction in the cost of securitization
to issuers can further reduce market efficiency, since it leads to more inefficient asset pro-
duction and creation of securities. We also show that under certain extreme conditions, the
cost of rating induced inefficient investment can fully wipe out the trade surplus, reducing
the social benefit of credit ratings to zero.
Next, we perform comparative statics on two otherwise identical markets that differ only
in the issuers access to securitization technology. We show that in market with traditional
investment assets, ratings outperform those in the market with securitized instruments in
the following sense: The probability that a high rated security is of low type is higher in the
latter market. The underlying cause for poor performance of ratings of securitized assets is
that when equilibrium ratings are inflated, issuers can make a profit by tuning the quality
of their issues to those that receive inflated ratings, and securitization technology is the
right tool for that. This leads to a decline of the average quality of securitized assets. As
a result, all else being equal, we expect ratings of asset-backed securities to under perform
their counterparts in corporate bonds market. Importantly, this result holds despite the
following properties of the equilibrium in the two markets: (1) the CRA’s profit is equal
in both markets and (2) the precision of ratings is higher in the market with securitized
assets. Put differently, poor performance of ratings of securitized instruments in our model
is not the result of the CRA’s attempt to draw business by over rating assets, nor is it due
to the difficulty of rating complex securities. It is the consequence of the relative ease with
which issuers can manipulate the qualities of their issues through securitization, and its
interaction with the CRA’s choice of ratings.
Next, we find that an increase in the CRA’s share of the gains from trade translates into
improved efficiency. In other words, market efficiency is directly related to the CRA’s
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market power. A more dominant CRA charges higher fees, which reduces the issuers’
profits, and in turn their incentives to undertake inefficient investments. We don’t model
competition among multiple CRAs. However, as far as the impact of competition on rating
fees is concerned, our findings suggest that by increasing competition among rating agencies,
ratings performance may suffer.
Finally, we examine the effects on efficiency of business cycles and informed speculation, via
their impacts on asset composition. The relative abundance of high quality assets during
expansions creates more profit opportunity for the issuers of low quality over priced assets,
which results in further inefficient asset production. Informed speculators can therefore
improve efficiency by bidding on the under-priced high quality assets.
1.2. Related Literature
The papers closest to ours is Lizzeri (1999) and Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013). In Lizzeri’s,
there are a continuum of seller types, risk neutral buyers, and intermediaries who sell
certification to sellers. He shows that in equilibrium, a monopolistic intermediary extracts
all the surplus without disclosing any information. Also, presence of an intermediary in
Lizzeri’s framework does not play a role in facilitating trade, but merely transfer of surplus.
A key driver of Lizzeri’s findings is that a seller’s valuation of his asset is 0, for all seller types.
Put differently, sellers’ reservation values are type independent. In Kartasheva and Yilmaz
(2013), issuers have type dependent reservation values. In equilibrium, the CRA discloses
information by selling noisy but informative ratings, which facilitates trade and restores
market efficiency. Also, they show that winner’s curse, caused by investor information
heterogeneity, prompts the CRA to increase ratings precision, with the purpose of curbing
informed investors’ ability to extract surplus.
Our paper extends the above works in two aspects. First, by introducing securitization
technology, we allow the composition of assets in our framework to be endogenously deter-
mined. We can then examine the impact of ratings on composition of assets and vice versa.
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In particular, our model provides a framework to compare ratings performances in markets
with traditional investment assets with those offering securitized instruments.
Second, we model market dominance of the CRA by the extent of its ability to extract the
surplus. In models with a single CRA and exogenous set of assets, like those in the above
works, the way surplus is split among the CRA and the issuers is typically irrelevant. How-
ever, we find that with endogenous asset composition, the CRA’s market dominance impacts
ratings performance and market efficiency: ratings performance and efficiency improve in a
market with a more dominant CRA.
Our work is also related to a number of other papers which pursue other factors that influ-
ence the performance of ratings. In a model of endogenous reputation, Mathis, McAndrews,
and Rochet (2009) show that when a large fraction of a monopoly CRA’s income comes
from rating complex assets, reputation concerns are not enough incentives to rein in rating
inflation. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) examine credit ratings in an environment fea-
turing two CRAs with reputation concerns and the possibility of shopping for ratings. They
find that presence of naive investors leads to rating inflation, which is only intensified with
competition among CRAs. In Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), CRAs always produce unbiased
noisy signals of asset quality. For complex assets, CRAs produce sufficiently different rat-
ings, which together with investor naivete, encourage rating shopping, and in turn, leads to
inflation. Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) show that rating based regulations increase demand
for high rated securities, which in turn create incentive for the CRA to inflate ratings.
1.3. The Model
There is an economy with 3 type of risk neutral agents: issuers, a CRA, and investors.
Issuer i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is endowed with mi units1 of an asset with unit market value vi ∈ V =
{v1, v2, v3}, where 0 = v1 < v2 < v3. We use type of an asset to refer its unit value. The
asset types are issuers private information. The reservation value of an asset type v for
1E.g. dollar face value in fixed income securities.
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issuers is δv, with δ < 1.
The difference between assets market and reservation values create an opportunity for issuers
to profit by trading them in the market. The total market value of issuers’ assets are equal
to
∑
imivi = m3v3 + m2v2. Therefore, the total gains from trade available is given by
(1 − δ)(m3v3 + m2v2). Absent the ratings, issuers may fail to realize all or part of the





where the left hand side is the average asset type, as well as its market price if issuers trade
all their assets in the absence of ratings. If condition (1.1) holds, issuer 3 would prefer
not to sell and there will be a market breakdown. A rating agency can resolve, perhaps
partially, the information asymmetry in the market and facilitate trade. We assume the
CRA observes asset types and has access to a rating structure which consists of a set of
signals and a function which maps each asset type to a probability distribution over the
signal set. The CRA charges issuers a flat fee φ ≥ 0 per unit of asset rated.
Issuers have access to a technology which consists of production and securitization segments.
The production’s output is an asset type vp. We assume issuers can produce any amount
of type vp asset. Similar to the endowment assets, the reservation value of a unit of type vp
asset is δvp. The securitization enables an issuer to combine any ratio of endowment and
production assets into a single security that replicates other asset types. The per unit cost
of production of vp asset is denoted by c. Alternatively, we can attribute the cost to the
securitization segment of the technology, or any combination of the two. A low c is meant
to represent markets with complex securitized asset classes, for instance, mortgage backed
securities. Markets with simple asset classes, such as corporate bonds, on the other hand,
can be modeled with a high c.
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We make the following assumption on type vp and the associated production cost.
0 = vp < c (1.2)
Condition (1.2) effectively makes investing in the production of type vp a negative NPV
investment. Absent any information asymmetry, issuers would not invest in this technology.
As a result, any potential investment in type vp asset must be driven by the ratings and
the ability of the issuers to combine assets into more complex securities, which is the focus
of this paper. And in fact, we will show that in equilibrium, it is sometimes optimal for a
profit maximizing issuer to invest in type vp asset. An example of such investments made
viable through access to securitization and ratings market is the sub prime lending prior to
financial crisis.
We say a type is targeted by the CRA if assets of that type are rated in equilibrium. Consider
an arbitrary targeted type v asset held by an issuer. Let U¯ denote the average market price
of type v, if rated. Aside from purchasing a rating, the issuer can choose between selling the
asset unrated or not selling. Let u¯ denote the highest average value of the asset to the issuer
if not rated. Then the rating creates a surplus of U¯ − u¯. Clearly, the CRA cannot charge
the issuer a fee larger than the surplus or the issuer would refuse to purchase the rating. We
place a stronger restriction by assuming that for any rating the CRA successfully sells, the
fee φ is bounded from above by a fraction µ of the surplusthe rating generates. In the above
scenario, for instance, this assumption requires that φ ≤ µ(U¯ − u¯). We refer to this upper
bound as the issuer’s willingness to pay for rating. We can think of µ as the CRA’s market
power. A CRA with more market power can extract a larger fraction of trade surplus. Our
key results require that the issuers receive a non zero fraction of the trade surplus, which
is ensured by assuming that µ < 1.2
We assume that once decided, the CRA is committed to the rating structure. Finally, the
2A setting in which this can happen is where the CRA and the issuers take turns to bid for the rating
fee and there is a discount factor between turns of less than 1.
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CRA’s choice of rating structure and fee is public information. The timing of the game is
as follows.
• t = 0. The CRA commits to a rating structure.
• t = 1. Issuers invest in the technology and decide their security portfolios.
• t = 2. The CRA announces the rating fee φ.
• t = 3. Issuers decide whether or not to solicit a rating for any security in their
portfolios.
• t = 4. Issuers decide whether or not to sell any of the securities in their portfolios in
the market.
The strategy of the CRA includes deciding a rating structure and a rating fee. The rating
structure is comprised of a non-empty set of signals S and a mapping from the interval
[0, v3], which is the set of all feasible security types, to probability distributions over S. For
instance, a viable rating structure is a set of 3 signals (s1, s2, s3) and a uniformly random
assignment of ratings to any security type v ∈ [0, v3]. With this rating structure, the CRA
discloses no information to the market. Another example is the following rating structure.
This structure divides security types into 3 tiers. Type v3, types v2 and above but below
v3 v2 v1
s3 1 0 0
s2 0 1 0
s1 0 0 1
Table 1.1: Tiered rating with full disclosure
v3, and finally types below v2. The mapping is then simply a deterministic assignment of
each tier to signals s1, s2, s3. Therefore, the rating fully reveals which tier a security belongs
to but does not differentiate between types belonging to the same tier. If the CRA adopts
the rating structure of table 1.1, it turns out that in the continuation game, issuers do not
invest in the technology. As a result, the only security types present in the continuation
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game are v1, v2, v3. Then effectively, this rating fully reveals all types. In the process of
deriving an equilibrium of the rating game, it will be shown that the structure of table 1.1
cannot be supported in equilibrium. Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013) demonstrate this fact
in detail.
A class of rating structures with 3 signals that is the focus of this paper is demonstrated
in table 2.1. Similar to table 1.1, this rating structure divides security types into 3 tires.
v3 v2 v1
s3 1 1− p 0
s2 0 p 0
s1 0 0 1
Table 1.2: Tiered noisy rating with inflation
Unlike table 1.1, however, the mapping from tiers to signals is not 1 to 1 and therefore,
ratings does not fully disclose which tier all assets belongs to. The lowest (highest) tier is
rated s1 (s3) with probability 1, while the middle tier is rated s2 with probability p and s3
with probability 1 − p. Notice that for p = 1, this rating structure is identical to the one
in table 1.1. As such, p measures how accurately the rating reveals the tier to which the
security belongs to. Following Kartasheva and Yilmaz, we refer to p as the rating precision.
Finally, note that in the rating structure of table 2.1, mid tier securities are assigned the
high rating of s3 with positive probability. On the other hand, no security is ever assigned a
rating lower than their corresponding tier. As such, we say that this structure demonstrates
rating inflation.
The strategy of an issuer, given the rating structure, is the choice of its security portfolio,
probability of soliciting ratings for each security in the portfolio, and the probability of
selling a security in the market based on the realized rating. For instance, consider an






















Each element in the set 1.3 describe a security, with the first quantity being the number









2 unit of type
v
2 asset. The issuer can construct this asset by combining
1
4 unit of type v
asset and 14 unit of vp asset (the production asset). Constructing this security would cost








4 = v, which is equal to the
value of the issuer’s endowment asset. The total size of the portfolio is 12 +
1
2 + 1 = 2, which
consists of 1 unit of type v and 1 unit of type vp assets. The total cost of constructing the
portfolio is c. A feasible follow-up set of actions for this issuer is 1) to solicit a rating for
the first security in 1.3 and sell it in the market if and only if it receives rating s3, 2) to sell
the second security without soliciting a rating, and 3) not to sell the third security.
Finally, there is a market in which the issuers can sell their assets. Since the market is
perfectly competitive, the price of a security is set to the expected value of the security.
The expectation is taken using the posterior belief of the market over the distribution of
types. The posterior belief is formed taking into account the strategy of the CRA and the
issuers, as well as the realization of the rating signals. Whenever possible, the posterior
must satisfy the Bayes’ rule. We can now formally define equilibrium of the rating game.
Definition 1.1. An equilibrium of the rating game is a set of the CRA’s rating structure
and rating fee, issuers’ security portfolio decisions and probabilities of soliciting a rating for
and selling each security in those portfolios, and market prices such that
1. The CRA maximizes profit given the strategy of the issuers and market prices.
2. Given CRA’s strategy and market prices, issuers’ maximize their profit.
3. Market price of a security offered in equilibrium is the expected value of that secu-
rity given the CRA and the issuers’ strategies and the realization of rating signal, if
available. The price of securities not offered can be arbitrarily assigned.
The strategy space of the CRA accommodates a variety of rating structures and in general
multiple equilibria. To narrow down the set of equilibrium candidates, we focus on rating
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structures of table 2.1. This rating structure has a number of interesting features. The first
one is that in an equilibrium utilizing rating structure of table 2.1, the CRA only targets
security types in the highest two tiers. A rating in which the CRA targets only a single tier
is never supported in equilibrium. Then the rating structure of table 2.1 effectively offers
the minimum required rating tiers in any equilibrium.
Another interesting feature of the rating structure of table 2.1 is that it exhibits rating
inflation. As will be presented shortly, there always exist an equilibrium in which the rating
structure belongs to table 2.1. On the other hand, Kartasheva and Yilmaz show that rating
deflation can be supported in equilibrium under certain restrictions. From a practical point
of view, issuers typically have the opportunity to observe their prospective ratings before
they decide to purchase them. In markets with multiple rating agencies, the issuers also
have the opportunity to shop around for an agency that offers the best rating. It is very
unlikely for a rating structure with deflation to survive in these environments.
Finally, in rating structure of table 2.1, rating precision is well defined by a single parameter
p. Also as important, we can easily quantify rating failure, defined here as the probability
that a high (s3) rated asset is of lower (v2) type. We use this metric as a measure of ratings
performance. In this aspect, by focusing on rating structure of table 2.1, we are able to
examine the impact of various parameters in the model on rating precision and ratings
performance.
Finally, we should mention that the majority of our results are independent of the choice of
equilibrium. For the remainder, one can qualitatively extend the results to other possible
equilibria.
1.4. Equilibrium
As we mentioned previously, our candidate for the equilibrium of the rating game has the
rating structure of table 2.1. Given the rating structure, the strategy of the CRA is fully
characterized by the choice of rating precision p ∈ [0, 1] and rating fee φ ≥ 0. Next, the
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following lemma allows us to narrow down the strategy space of the issuers in the equilibrium
candidate.
Lemma 1.1. If the rating structure is according to table 2.1, the portfolios of the issuers
in the continuation game will include only asset types in the set {v1, v2, v3}.
The formal proof is included in the appendix. Intuitively, since any type strictly between
two tier cutoffs is rated identical to the type matching the lower cutoff, issuers can profit
by decomposing any security type into types matching the cutoffs.
Next, by Lemma 1.1, all s1 rated securities must be of type v1 or vp and is therefore priced 0
by the market. Since the production of type vp is costly, we can conclude that the portfolio
of no issuer would include type vp securities. In short, the above arguments imply that the
portfolios of issuers 1 and 2 only contain type v1 and v2 assets, respectively, and that they
do not invest in the technology. The portfolio of issuer 3 has the following form.
{












units of type v2 security, made by combining type v3 and type vp assets. Notice
that the total value of issuer 3’s portfolio is (1− α)m3v3 + αm3 v3v2 v2 = m3v3, as one should
expect. The parameter α must be solved for in equilibrium.
Finally, define Ui to be the equilibrium unit price of an asset rated si, and U0 denote the
equilibrium unit price of an unrated asset. Also, we partition the set of technology costs c
into three subsets according to the following cutoffs.
c :=(1− µ)(1− δ)v2 (1.5)
c :=(1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3 +m2v2
m3 +m2
. (1.6)
We refer to intervals [0, c], (c, c), [c, inf) as low, intermediate, and high technology costs,
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respectively.
Proposition 1.1 (Equilibrium of the rating game). There exists an equilibrium in which
the rating structure belongs to table 2.1. Issuers 1, 2, and 3’s security portfolios, respectively,
are
{(m1, v1} , {(m2, v2)} ,
{








Issuer 1 does not solicit a rating and offers the portfolio for sale in the market at unit
price U0 = U1 = 0. Issuers 2 and 3 purchase rating for all the securities in their portfolios.
Conditional on rating s2, both issuers 2 and 3 sell the corresponding securities in the market
at unit price U2 = v2. Conditional on rating s3, both issuers 2 and 3 sell the corresponding
securities in the market at unit price U3. Equilibrium values of rating precision p, φ, α,







δv3−v2+ c1−µ c < c < c
1 c ≤ c
φ =

µ(1− δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 c ≥ c
c µ1−µ c < c < c
µ(1− δ)v2 c ≤ c
α =






c < c < c










Figure 1.1: Rating precision and rating fee
U3 =

(1− δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 + δv3 c ≥ c
c
1−µ + δv3 c < c < c
v2 c ≤ c
The proof is provided in the appendix. When the technology cost is high (c ≥ c), replicating
type v2 by combining types v3 and vp is not profitable for issuer 3. In this scenario, all
issuers’ portfolios in equilibrium contain only their corresponding endowment assets. The
equilibrium outcome in this case is identical to the equilibrium of a modified version of the
rating game in which the technology is not available, which we will refer to as the rating
game without securitization 3. in this equilibrium, only issuers 2 and 3 purchase ratings.
The rating is informative (p > 0), despite being noisy (p < 1). The market rationally
expects that securities rated s3 can be either type v2 or v3. As a result, on average, type
v3 is under priced, where as type v2 is over priced. The key feature of the CRA’s optimal
strategy is to adjust the rating so as to equalize issuers 2’s and 3’s willingness to pay. That
is, the following must hold in equilibrium.
U3 − δv3 =[pv2 + (1− p)U3]− δv2. (1.8)
3This is essentially the game analyzed in detail in Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013).
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The left hand side in equation (1.8) is the expected market price of type v3 net of its
reservation value for issuer 3. The right hand side is the same for type v2. This allows the
CRA to maximize its share of the total gains from trade by setting
φ = µ(U3 − δv3). (1.9)
Condition (1.8) uniquely determines the rating precision to be δ(m3+m2)m3+δm2 . Notice that p
is increasing in m2m3 , the ratio of the units of type v2 to type v3 securities. The reason
is that as the relative population size of type v2 security increases, the market expects a
larger fraction of s3 rated securities to be of type v2. Consequently, market price of s3
rated securities decreases. The CRA’s response is to increase rating precision to maintain
equality of issuers’ willingness to pay.
Conditions (1.8) and (1.9) reveal another important feature of the equilibrium. If one
considers purchasing ratings an investment by the issuer, the return on type v3 security,




This prompts issuer 3 to replicate type v2 by utilizing the technology, provided that the
cost of the technology is not prohibitively high.
When technology cost enters the intermediate range (c < c < c), replicating type v2 becomes
profitable for issuer 3. In equilibrium, issuer 3’s portfolio now contains a mix of type v2 and
v3 securities. This means that the equilibrium aggregate size of type v2 securities relative
to type v3 is now larger than
m2
m3
. The CRA anticipates this and increases rating precision
such that issuer 3 is indifferent between having type v2 and v3 securities in its portfolio.
At the same time, the CRA’s choice of rating precision together with issuer 3’s portfolio
decision ensures all rated types’ willingness to pay for rating are equal. As before, the CRA
sets the rating fee equal to the rated types’ willingness to pay. Since the relative population
size of type v2 to type v3 has increased, the equilibrium φ is smaller compared to that in
high technology cost scenario. However, the addition of type vp to issuer 3’s portfolio also
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means that the aggregate size of the rated securities has increased. These two effects fully
cancel out and consequently, CRA’s share of the total gains from trade remains unchanged,
despite the change in equilibrium composition of rated securities. As the technology cost
decreases, ratio of type v2 to type v3 securities in issuer 3’s portfolio, and accordingly, rating
precision increases (figure 1.1). Meanwhile, φ and market price of s3 rated securities, U3,
decrease.
When technology cost reached the low cutoff c, issuer 3’s optimal portfolio is 100% comprised
of type v2 security. Therefore in equilibrium, all rated securities are of type v2. Since in
this case only a single type is rated, enforcing equal willingness to pay across rated types
is trivial. The CRA sets rating fee equal to the willingness to pay of type v2, that is
φ = µ(1 − δ)v2. As a result, the CRA’s profit remains the fraction µ of the total gains
from trade, same as prior scenarios. For any c < c, issuer 3’s portfolio is independent of the
technology cost. Naturally, rating precision and fee remain constant (figure 1.1).
Following Proposition 1.1, we can proceed to derive the profit of the CRA and the issuers
in equilibrium. The CRA’s profit piCRA is defined as the sum of the rating fee collected by
the agency. An issuer i’s profit pii is defined as the market price of the issuer’s portfolio net
of the technology cost and the reservation value.
Proposition 1.2. The profit of the CRA and issuers 2 and 3 in the equilibrium of Propo-
sition 1.1 is given by
piCRA =µ(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2)
pi3 =

(1− µ)(1− δ)m3m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 c ≥ c
m3c c < c < c
(1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3 − v3−v2v2 m3c c ≤ c
pi2 =

(1− µ)(1− δ)m2m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 c ≥ c
m2c c < c < c











Figure 1.2: Issuer’s profit normalized by the endowment size
The total gains from trade available is equal to (1 − δ)(m3v3 + m2v2). Notice that since
vp = 0, the production of type vp asset does not add to the gains from trade. Recall that
in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.1, the CRA’s strategy involves ensuring the equality
of all rated types’ willingness to pay for rating. Having established that, the CRA then
sets rating fee equal to those types willingness to pay. Therefore, the CRA manages to
extract fraction µ of the gains from trade, regardless of the technology cost, as presented
in Proposition 1.2.
Issuers do not invest in the technology when the cost c is high. The average value of
rated securities in this case is m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 . Since type v2 and v3 have equal willingness
to pay for rating in equilibrium, issuers 2 and 3’s profits from trading a unit of type v2
or v3 securities is then given by the product of the average gain from trade of a unit of
type v2 or v3, which is equal to (1 − δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 , and the fraction of gain from trade not
extracted by the CRA, 1 − µ. Note that absent any resources spent on the technology,
issuers and the CRA’s profit adds up to the total gains from trade available. That is
piCRA + pi3 + pi2 = (1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2).
For Intermediate technology costs, issuers profits are functions of c. As c decreases, the
share of type v2 security in issuer 3’s portfolio, and consequently the total amount of type
v2 in the market increases. Rationally, type v2 security, on average, is priced lower in the
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market, and therefore, issuer 2’s profit decreases (figure 1.2). The effect of a decrease in c
on issuer 3’s profit is two fold. On the one hand, the issuer 3’s investment in the technology
increases. On the other hand, the average market price of issuer 3’s portfolio increases. In
this case, the former effect always dominates and reduces issuer 3’s profit (figure 1.2).
When c falls below c, issuer 3’s investment in the technology is capped. All rated securities
are type v2 and are correctly priced v2 by the market. Issuer 2’s profit is then simply the
product of the gains from trade of type v2 and the fraction 1 − µ. Issuer 3’s share of the
gains from trade is similar, which is 1−µ times the gains from trade of type v3. In addition,
issuer 3 bears the cost of investment in the technology. In this case, however, since total
units of type vp in issuer 3’s portfolio is constant, a decrease in c results in an increase in
the profit of issuer 3, as illustrated by figure 1.2.
An important observation to be made is regarding issuers’ profits for intermediate technol-
ogy costs. In this region, issuer 3’s strategy to maximize profit involves investing in the
technology with the aim of replicating type v2. Interestingly, as can be seen in figure 1.2,
the profit of issuer 3 in this region is strictly lower than its profit in the high cost region.
At the same time, issuer 2’s profit also suffers from issuer 3’s investment in the technology.
In other words, access to the technology has adverse effect on the profits of both issuer 2
and 3. Put differently,
Corollary 1.1. For c ∈ (c, c), both issuer 2 and 3 can strictly increase their equilibrium
profits if they commit not to invest in the technology.
1.5. Market Efficiency
We now proceed to evaluate the efficiency of the equilibrium outcome of the rating game.
As our fist benchmark for total surplus, we begin by establishing the first best solution.
A social planner can maximize surplus by fully disclosing asset types. This would ensure
that all issuers trade their assets for their true market values, and in turn, eliminates any
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incentives to invest in the technology. Therefore, the first best total surplus is equal to
WFB =(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2).
The equilibrium total surplus consists of two parts: (1) The trade surplus, or the total
gains from trade and (2) The cost of investment in the technology. The CRA’s strategy
ensures that in equilibrium all available gains from trade are realized, which is equal to
(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2), as established by Proposition 1.1. The total cost of investing in the
technology is equal to mpc, where mp denotes the aggregate amount of type vp asset in the
portfolio of the issuers. Then the equilibrium total surplus is given by
WEq =(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2)−mpc. (1.10)
A quick comparison of WEq and WFB reveals that when equilibrium outcome involves
investment in the technology, market is inefficient. The inefficiency in the equilibrium
outcome is equal to the total cost of investing in the technology. We can use Proposition
1.1 to derive the equilibrium total surplus.
Proposition 1.3. In the equilibrium of of Proposition 1.1, mp, the amount of type vp in
issuer 3’s portfolio, is given by
mp =

0 c ≥ c
(1−δ)(1−µ)(m3v3+m2v2)−c(m3+m2)






The total surplus is calculated as
WEq =

(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2) c ≥ c
µ(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2) + c(m3 +m2) c < c < c





Figure 1.3: Equilibrium total surplus
For high technology costs, issuers do not invest and the equilibrium achieves the first best
total surplus. In the intermediate range, investment in the technology decreases the total
surplus. As c decreases, total amount of type vp produced increases. The affect of increase
in investment dominates the decrease in c and as a result, the surplus decreases. Finally,
when c drops below the threshold c, total amount of type vp is capped. Any further decrease
in technology cost would then increase the total surplus as illustrated in figure 1.3.
With Proposition 1.1, we established an equilibrium in which all available gains from trade
is realized, of which fraction µ is extracted by the CRA. Therefore, in any other equilibrium
of the rating game, all available gains from trade must be realized. Then the inefficiency in
any equilibrium outcome is equal to the total cost of investment in the technology. It then
follows that an equilibrium with smaller mp generates more surplus, i.e., is more efficient.
The rating game in our model allows for multiple equilibria with varying investment levels
in the technology. For instance consider the rating structure of table 1.3. Notice that this
v3 −  v2 v1
s3 1 1− p′ 0
s2 0 p
′ 0
s1 0 0 1
Table 1.3: An alternative rating structure
is identical to the rating structure in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.1 with the exception
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that the highest tier cutoff is changed to v3 − . Intuitively, this rating structure would
induce issuer 3 to have a portfolio of type v2 and type v3 −  securities. Replicating type
v3 −  requires additional type vp asset. Then we would expect in an equilibrium in which
the rating structure is set to table 1.3, the total amount of type vp asset to be larger than
that in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.1. An important question that follows is whether
or not there exists an equilibrium that is more efficient than the equilibrium of Proposition
1.1.
Proposition 1.4. In any equilibrium of the rating game, the aggregate amount of type vp
in the portfolio of the issuers is bounded from below by the quantity in equation 1.11.
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition behind Proposition 1.4 is the following. Consider
two security types vl and vh, where vl < vh and both types are rated in equilibrium.
Equilibrium requires that replicating type vl not be profitable, which sets an upper bound
on the gain from trade of type vl. Since a fraction of the gain from trade is extracted by
the CRA as rating fee, an upper bound on the gain from trade translates into an upper
bound on rating fee. Since the profit of the CRA in any equilibrium is constant, an upper
bound on φ is equivalent to a lower bound on total type vp produced in equilibrium. The
following is an immediate result of Proposition 1.4.
Corollary 1.2. The equilibrium of Proposition 1.1 is the most efficient equilibrium of the
rating game.
Our next benchmark for total surplus is the market solution when there is no CRA. Absent
ratings, market outcome can vary from complete breakdown to all gains realized. The









Inequality 1.12 states that issuer 3’s reservation value for type v3 is strictly higher than the
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average type of the endowment assets held by issuers. This condition ensures that absent
ratings, issuer 3 would not trade its assets in the market, since otherwise the price (the right
hand side) would be strictly lower than the reservation value (the right hand side). With
issuer 3 out of the market, the average type of the remaining assets is equal to m2v2m2+m1 , the
right hand side of inequality 1.13. Then with condition 1.13 satisfied, issuer 2 would also
pull out of the market. Since trade of type v1 does not generate any gains, whether issuer
1 stays or leaves the market is irrelevant. In this scenario (scenario 1), effectively there is a
complete market break down and trade surplus is 0.
Clearly, ratings improve market efficiency in this scenario as they restore trades in the
market. On the other hand, inefficient investment can arise in the market with ratings.
In comparison, no investment in the technology takes place in the absence of ratings in
scenario 1 , since no securities is traded in the market. However, the surplus generated by
the ratings is always larger than the total cost of investment in the technology, as is evident
in figure 1.3. Therefore, ratings unambiguously improve market surplus in in scenario 1.
However, it has to be noted that the scale of this improvement in market efficiency can
vary greatly, depending on model parameters. In fact, the following lemma shows that the
impact of ratings on efficiency can be made arbitrarily close to 0.
Lemma 1.2. lim|µ|+|c−c|+|v2|→0m3c = (1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2).
The other extreme case (scenario 2), is when absent ratings, all assets are traded in the
market. This happens when condition 1.12 is reversed, in which case assets are priced equal
to the average type m3v3+m2v2m3+m2+m1 . Between the market without a CRA in scenario 2 and the
market with ratings, the one that invests less in the technology is clearly more efficient.





Then with scenario 2 and condition (1.14) satisfied, the market without CRA achieves first
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best total surplus. On the other hand if c < c, the equilibrium of the rating game involves
investment in the technology (Proposition 1.1). If all these conditions are jointly satisfied,
the total surplus in the market without a CRA is strictly higher than that in the one with
a CRA.





< c < c. (1.15)
For the set of parameters in 1.15, presence of a CRA reduces total surplus.
To summarize our findings, we showed that the introduction of ratings does not always
improve market efficiency, and when it does, the magnitude of this improvement can vary
greatly based on economic conditions, asset classes, and composition of assets among others.
1.6. Comparative statics and model predictions
In this section we study the predictions of our model. For this section, we make the following
assumption on the technology cost.
Assumption 1.1. Technology cost satisfies c < c < c.
Assumption 1.1 ensures that a non zero amount of type vp asset is produced in any equilib-
rium. In the equilibrium of Proposition 1.1, this assumption implies that issuer 3’s portfolio
choice problem has an interior solution. In other words, issuer 3’s portfolio contains non
zero amounts of both type v3 and v2 securities. For other technology costs, issuer 3’s port-
folio is either 100% type v2 or 100% type v3 securities. In those cases, issuer 3’s portfolio
decision does not react to changes in parameters of the model.
Our first prediction pertains to the impact of technology cost c on rating precision and
performance. Rating precision is a measure of how truthful the CRA is in assigning a
rating to an asset. In the equilibrium of Proposition 1.1, this is captured by parameter p.
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By rating performance we refer to how accurately ratings signal the quality of corresponding
assets. Here, we use failure rate pf , which is defined as the probability of an s3 rated asset
being type v2, as a measure for rating performance. A lower failure rate corresponds to a
better performance. For the rating structure of Proposition 1.1, we can use the Bayes’ rule




(1− p)Pr(v2) + Pr(v3) .
Proposition 1.6. A decrease in technology cost leads to an increase in rating precision and







A decrease in c prompts issuer 3 to allocate a larger portion of its portfolio to type v2 security.
The CRA’s response to the increase in overall type v2 population size in the market is to
increase rating precision, with the purpose of keeping type v3’s and v2’s willingness to pay
for rating equal.
The impact of a decrease in technology cost on rating performance is not as straightforward.
One the one hand, an increase in rating precision improves performance. On the other hand,
as argued above, a decrease in c results in an increase in the overall population size of type
v2 securities. All else being equal, more of type v2 securities in the market results in higher
probability of s3 rated assets being of type v2, namely, poorer rating performance. The net
effect of the two forces is a decrease in rating performance.
Proposition 1.6 allows us to examine ratings performance variations across different asset
types. In particular, we can compare corporate bonds, a high c market, and mortgage
backed securities, a low c one. Proposition 1.6 suggests that all else being equal, MBS
ratings perform poorly compared to that in corporate bonds market, which is consistent
24
with several empirical findings 4. In addition, our findings suggest inefficient investment in
assets used in the construction of securities to be higher compared to that in traditional
corporate investments (figure 1.3)).
Rating agencies faced heavy criticism for their role in the sub prime mortgage crisis, and
poor ratings performance were often cited as evidence of failure of the industry. In one
common line of criticism, opponents would point to the rating agencies’ incentives to pur-
posely inflate their ratings to attract more businesses. This argument, however, fails to
explain why performance of ratings varies across asset classes. Our framework provides
an alternative mechanism of generating poor ratings performance which departs from the
above common argument in two major ways. First, the equilibrium profit of the CRA in our
model does not depend on c, or the issuers’ investment in the technology. In other words,
the CRA is no more inclined to inflate ratings of MBS than corporate bonds. Second, all
else being equal, Proposition 1.6 predicts higher precision of ratings of MBS than that for
corporate bonds, which is contrary to the critics’ argument.
Our next prediction is about the effect of the CRA’s market dominance on rating perfor-
mance. We use µ as a measure of the CRA’s dominance in the market. A CRA with more
market dominance can extract a larger fraction of trade surplus by charging higher fees,
which is equivalent to higher µ in our model.
Proposition 1.7. Rating performance is increasing in µ, whereas, inefficient investment







As µ increases, issuers’ shares of the trade surplus decrease. This in turn reduces the
4Ashcraft et al. (2010) find that ratings quality declined with the increase in MBS issuance between
2005 and 2007. Specifically, subordination levels for subprime and Alt-A MBS were lower during this time,
followed by subsequent ratings downgrades. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) find that around 70% of the
value of securities issued by CLOs is rated AAA backed by collaterals rated B to B+ on average. Griffin and
Tang (2012) find that the increase in the size of the AAA tranche of the CDOs from 2003 to 2007 is positively
related to future downgrades. Stanton and Wallace (2017) find that subordination levels for CMBSs fell
considerably in the years leading to the financial crisis, leaving scant protection for ”safe” tranches.
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fraction of issuer 3 portfolio dedicated to type v2 securities. Put differently, issuer 3’s
investment level in the technology is reduced, hence, lower inefficiency. As a result, the
overall population size of type v2 in the market is smaller, which results in lower failure
rate.
Easing the barriers to entry in the credit rating industry and encouraging competition
among CRAs has been a major policy response to the poor performance of the three large
rating agencies in recent years (White (2010)). Competition among multiple CRAs can
affect two fundamental aspects of ratings: rating structure and rating fee. This framework
makes no predictions on the impact of competition on ratings structure. However, so far
as the role of competition in reducing rating fees is concerned, our model associates poor
performance and inefficient investment with competition, particularly in highly securitized
asset classes.
Next, we examine how changes to m3m2 , the ratio of population sizes of the endowment assets
of issuers 2 and 3, affect ratings and efficiency. We offer two interpretations for changes to
m3
m2
. In one, we use m3m2 as an indicator for business cycles. During growth periods, market
is bullish in their risk assessment and therefore, high quality assets are in relatively large
supply, namely high m3m2 . Low
m3
m2
, in turn, corresponds to recessions.
In another case, m3m2 allows us to comment on the role of informed speculation on ratings
and economic efficiency. Recall that a consequence of the CRA’s strategy to equate rated
types’ willingness to pay for rating is that high quality assets are on average under priced by
the market. This creates an opportunity for informed speculation. For instance, consider
a period prior to t = 0 in our model, in which informed speculators can bid for issuers
assets. Suppose that speculators have perfect information and are able to predict the rating
structure the CRA is going to implement in the future. In that case, speculators know that
type v3 assets will be under-priced in equilibrium, and there is an opportunity for profitable
trade. On the other hand, since type v2 assets are on average overpriced in equilibrium,
there is no opportunity for profitable trade of this type. In short, informed speculation
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reduces m3m2 .
Proposition 1.8. Rating precision and performance are not functions of m3m2 . Inefficiency
is increasing in m3m2 .
The first part of Proposition 1.8 is a notable feature of the equilibrium of our rating game,
according to which, the CRA’s design for the ratings does not depend on the composition
of issuers’ endowment assets. Notice that, however, according to Proposition 1.1, issuer
3’s portfolio decision is in fact a function of m3m2 . An implication of issuer 3’s portfolio
choice is that in equilibrium, the ratio of the population of type v3 to type v2 in issuers




, remains constant with respect to m3m2 . In other
words, if the sizes of issuers’ endowments change, issuer 3 rebalances its portfolio such that
the composition of assets in the market remains unchanged. Therefore, Proposition 1.8 is
not in disagreement with Kartasheva and Yilmaz’ finding that composition of assets is a
key decider of the CRA’s rating design.
As m3m2 increases, to maintain the composition of assets in the market, issuer 3 must increase
the size of type v2 security in its portfolio. This requires issuer 3 to increase investment in
the technology, which results in higher inefficiency. Note that this part of Proposition 1.8
does not rely on the choice of the equilibrium and is true in general for any equilibrium of
the rating game.
Proposition 1.8 predicts that the level of inefficient investment is higher in growth periods.
This is not to be confused by over investment during economic bubbles, brought about by
overestimation of the true value of assets or its future prospects. Note that in our model,
issuers are perfectly informed of the true value of the assets. Furthermore, the average
market price is always equal to the average asset type, contrary to market prices during a
bubble. The over investment in our model is due to mis-pricing of assets, which the issuers
can take advantage of by issuing securities matching the type of over priced assets. In
addition, Proposition 1.8 suggests that not only economic bubbles involve over investment
in assets that are over-valued, but also has a positive feedback on inefficient investments in
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other assets underlying securitized instruments.
Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013) showed that the winner’s curse due to heterogeneity of in-
vestors’ information would prompt the CRA to increase the precision of ratings. Proposition
1.8 suggests a different role for informed investors in which, rating precision is not affected
by informed speculation. Instead, informed speculators help mitigate inefficient investment
by bidding for under priced assets and in the process, reducing their population in the
market.
1.7. Conclusion
Our model proposes access to securitization technology as an important factor in explaining
the differences in ratings of ABSs and corporate bonds. We show that the well documented
poor performances of ratings of ABSs prior to the financial crisis can be simulated in a
rational setting with a strategic CRA and privately informed issuers who have access to a
costly production and securitization technology. We show that as the cost of accessing this
technology decreases, the equilibrium performance of ratings declines. In addition, we show
that access to securitization can negatively impact efficiency as it gives rise to inefficient
investments in poor quality assets. Finally, we show that the inefficient investment induced
by securitization is procyclical.
To achieve a closed form solution for our rating game, we made simplifying assumptions
that may be worth expanding upon. We assumed that the addition of the production asset
to the issuers’ portfolios does not change the total available gains from trade. As such,
the CRA is not able to increase its profit by further inflating the ratings to prompt more
investment in the production by issuers. Relaxing this assumption can bear interesting
results.
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CHAPTER 2 : Credit Ratings and Investment
2.1. Introduction
The focus of the existing literature in credit ratings has been primarily on the ability of
ratings to mitigate information asymmetry in the market and the mechanisms through
which ratings performance are affected such as competition among rating agencies, rating
shopping, composition of assets being rated, complexity of the asset, and regulations, among
others. The other side of the coin, and perhaps as important, is the mechanisms through
which ratings impacts go beyond their obvious role as a source of information for investors,
and influence decisions that would have significant ramifications for the market and even
the economy as a whole. In this work, we explore how investment decisions are influenced
directly by ratings, or other market conditions through their impact on ratings.
We consider a model with a continuum of firms and a continuum of investment opportu-
nities, or projects, with decreasing returns. Investing in these projects require an initial
capital injection which firms lack. In order to raise capital, the firm have to choose be-
tween borrowing from informed investors who demand information rent, or issuing bonds
to competitive uninformed investors. Firms that decide to issue bonds can sell them at a
higher price by soliciting ratings from a single CRA in exchange for a ratings fee. The CRA
is strategic in designing the ratings, and maximizes collected rating fees. This in general
implies a ratings system that is informative without fully revealing the type of issuers.
We first solve the first best solution, assuming away the information asymmetry between
investors and firms issuing bonds. We then prove the existence of an equilibrium of the
game and derive the conditions for which the total amount invested in the projects in the
equilibrium outcome is equal to that in the first best solution.
Next, we show that if the projects’ expected returns remain unchanged, an increase in the
riskiness of the projects leads to more investment in equilibrium. In the special case that
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the equilibrium outcome coincides with first best, this implies that more risk induces over
investment and reduced risk, under investment. Note that this is purely a result of firms
financing through issuing bonds with imperfect credit ratings. In particular, the well known
phenomenon that a firm’s equity holders are prone to excessive risk since they capture the
upside while their downside is limited, is not present in our model.
We next consider the effect of a risk shock that equally affects the value of all issue types on
firms’ equilibrium aggregate investment. We find that under certain conditions, risk shocks
leads to under investment. This may partially explain the slow recovery following the recent
financial crisis.
We also examine the influence of the CRA’s market power on the efficiency of the equi-
librium outcome. We show that an increase in the CRA’s market power unambiguously
reduces equilibrium aggregate investment. However, the effect on efficiency is dependent
on the macro conditions. During growth periods that are commonly accompanied by over
investment, a more dominant CRA is a positive force towards efficiency. On the other hand,
during recessions, this market dominance hampers recovery by reducing firms’ incentives to
invest.
2.2. Related Literature
Our framework builds on Lizzeri (1999) and Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013). Lizzeri explores
the incentives if an intermediary to disclose information in a model with a continuum of
sellers holding assets with varying values to the buyers, but crucially worth 0 to sellers
themselves. He then shows that there is an equilibrium in which the intermediary extracts
all the trade surplus without disclosing any information to the buyers. In Kartasheva and
Yilmaz (2013), issuers of assets have non zero, type dependent reservation values for their
assets. They show that in equilibrium, ratings do disclose information. Moreover, ratings
improve efficiency by facilitating trade. They also explore how the composition of assets in
the market and presence of informed speculators would impact ratings precision.
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This work explores the flip side of ratings market and studies the impact of ratings on
issuers incentives to make investments. To that end, we endogenize the set of issues by
considering issuers as firms facing investment opportunities without the required capital.
To raise capital, firms issue bonds whose market price depends on the ratings assigned to
them by the CRA. As strategic investors, firms take into account not only the intrinsic NPV
of the investment opportunity, but also their effective cost of capital which is influenced by
ratings. We then analyze the impact of ratings on inefficient investment and the role of
economic environment in reducing this inefficiency, or otherwise.
The following works study other factors affecting ratings performance. Mathis, McAndrews,
and Rochet (2009) consider the role of reputation in reducing a monopolistic CRA’s incen-
tive to inflate ratings. They show that reputation is an effective mechanism only if a small
fraction if the CRA’s profit is based on rating complex securities. In a model with two
competing CRAs, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) show that when issuers can shop for
ratings, competition can lead to further inflated ratings. Finally, increase demand for high
rated securities, created by regulations, is another source of inflated ratings as demonstrated
in Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013).
2.3. Model
2.3.1. Market
There is a market with 3 type of risk neutral agents: issuers, a CRA, and investors. Issuers
possess debt and they intend to sell them in the market. We assume there are 3 types of
debt, v1, v2, v3, where vi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the market value of a unit face value of type vi and
types satisfy 0 = v1 < v2 < v3. We refer to the aggregate face value of type vi debt by mi.
For simplicity, we assume m1 and m3 are exogenous, unlike m2 which we need to solve for.
Debt types are issuers private information. Finally, all market participants are risk neutral
and the discount rate is normalized to 0.
There are two potential buyers of issuers’ debt: uninformed investors and informed in-
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vestors. Selling debt to uninformed investors is meant to capture issuing bonds. Unin-
formed investors are competitive but do not observe types of issues and therefore price
them at their expected values given all the publicly available information. Informed in-
vestors, on the other hand, observe debt types but extract information rent. Specifically,
informed investors pay δ ∈ (0, 1) for a debt of value 1. We assume that informed investors
do not participate in the bond market, or they are small enough not to impact bond prices.
If an issuer decides to sell its debt to uninformed investors, that is issue bonds, it can
enhance issuers information by soliciting ratings. We assume there exist a single CRA in
the market, which observes issue types and has access to a rating technology which consists
of a set of signals and a function which maps each issue type to a probability distribution
over the signal set. The CRA charges issuers a flat fee φ ≥ 0 per unit of face value of
issue rated. We assume that once decided, the CRA is committed to the rating technology.
Finally, the CRA’s choice of rating technology and fee is public information.
We say an issue type is targeted by the CRA if the type is rated in equilibrium. Consider
an arbitrary targeted type v held by an issuer. Let U¯ denote the average market price
of type v, if rated. Aside from soliciting a rating, the issuer can choose to sell the bonds
unrated or sell the issue to the informed investors. Let u¯ denote the highest average value
of the asset to the issuer if not rated. Then the rating creates a surplus of U¯ − u¯. Clearly,
the CRA cannot charge the issuer a fee larger than the surplus or the issuer would refuse
to purchase the rating. We place a stronger restriction by assuming that for any rating
the CRA successfully sells, the fee φ is bounded from above by a fraction µ of the surplus
the rating generates. In the above scenario, for instance, this assumption requires that
φ ≤ µ(U¯− u¯). We refer to this upper bound as the issuer’s willingness to pay for rating. We
can think of µ as the CRA’s market power. A CRA with more market power can extract a
larger fraction of trade surplus. Our key results require that the issuers receive a non zero
fraction of the trade surplus, which is ensured by assuming that µ < 1.1
1A setting in which this can happen is where the CRA and the issuers take turns to bid for the rating
fee and there is a discount factor between turns of less than 1.
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2.3.2. Firms
We now discuss in detail the issuers of type v2 debt. There exists a continuum of firms and
investment opportunities (projects), both represented by the positive real numbers. The
outcome of a project x is binomial which are either a success where the project’s return is
R(x) or a fail in which case the return is 0. The probability of success is identical for all
projects and is denoted by q.
Undertaking a project requires investment of 1 unit such that the aggregate required capital
to invest in all the projects between a and b for arbitrary a < b is given by
∫ b
a dy = b − a.
Besides the capital requirement, a firm incurs a cost c for investing in a project. This cost
can be firms’ opportunity cost of investing in the projects or the effort required to develop
the project. We make the following assumption regarding R(.).
Assumption 2.1. R is a continuous and monotonically decreasing function. Further,
qR(0) > c+ 1δ and lima→+∞R(a) = 0.
Assumption 2.1 ensures that the equilibrium exists, is unique, and is an interior solution.
Notice in particular the part qR(0) > c+ 1δ . This condition states that if firms’ could only
borrow from informed investors, the total invested in the projects by all firms would be
strictly positive. Since informed investors are the most expensive source of capital for the
firms, this condition ensures that in equilibrium, the aggregate investment in the projects
is always non zero.
Firms lack the required capital to invest in the projects. We assume the only method of
raising capital is issuing debt. A debt issued by firm x is a contract that promises to pay
the lenders firm x’s cash flows from the project up to a specified amount D(x), which we
refer to as the face value of debt. We also assume that firms are committed to invest all
the funds they raise by issuing debt in the projects. In particular, this means that (1) the
firms are not allowed to extract any amount of the raised funds and (2) cancel investment
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We assume that if firm x decides to invest in a project, x’s cash flows are limited to those
generated by the project and that lenders are able to verify the outcome of the projects.
We make the following assumptions regarding firms’ capacity to raise capital and projects’
outcomes.
Assumption 2.2. The face value of firm i’s debt Di is bounded from above by 1.
The above assumption is intended to make sure that the total investment of any firm is
infinitesimal. As such, the upper bound of 1 is arbitrary and has no impact on the aggregate
investment in the projects or firms’ cost of capital. Under assumption 2.2, when making
investment decisions, firm x can ignore the impact of its decision on the market. Then if
firm x decides to invest, it will issue as much debt as possible which by assumption 2.2 is
equal to 1.
Assumption 2.3. The outcome of all projects are perfectly correlated.
Assumption 2.3 ensures that an arbitrary firm i’s investment strategy would only impact the
firm’s expected return and not it’s risk profile due to diversification. In this case, regardless
of the firm’s investment decision, the outcome is binary with probability of success given
by q.
We also assume that if a firm decides to invest in the projects, the cash flow generated by
the project if it succeeds is sufficient to pay off the debt holders, regardless of how much
capital the firm raises by issuing bonds. A sufficient condition that ensures this outcome is
a lower bound on cost c.
Assumption 2.4. c > 1δ .
To see how assumption 2.4 ensures the intended outcome, notice that to borrow 1 unit, the
most a firm must promise to pay to debt holders is 1δq , which is the price of borrowing from
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private investors. Since a firm would not invest in a project if the expected return is not at







Given risk neutrality and 0 discount rate, the market value of a unit of face value of firm
x’s debt is equal to q provided that if the project outcome is a success, the cash flow is
sufficient to pay all the debt holders, which is guaranteed by assumption 2.4. Then the
debt of all firms investing in these projects have identical unit value, which is equal to q.
In other words, the type of these debts is given by v2 = q.
2.3.3. Incentives and strategies
The timing of the investment game is the following.
1. Firms decide whether or not to invest. Firms which do invest, issue debts of face value
1. Without loss of generality, suppose firms [0, x] have decided to invest.
2. The CRA decides rating precision p and fee φ.
3. Issuers decide whether to solicit a rating and whether to sell the issues to uniformed
or informed investors.
4. Starting from firm 0, each firm y ∈ [0, x] invests the raised capital in a project not
taken by firms [0, y).
5. Project outcome are determined. If a project succeeds, the firm pays its debt holders
from project cash flows, and the rest is pocketed by the firm. If a project fails, the
firm and its debt holder get nothing.
In making investment decisions, a firm’s objective is to maximize the value of the equity.
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However, since in our model firms’ debt is sold at their expected market value, debt holders
break even, and as such, maximizing equity value is equivalent to maximizing enterprise
value. The strategy of a firm x is the probability of investing in the projects, given the
strategy of other firms, the strategy of issuers, and the CRA.
An Issuer’s objective is to maximize the raised capital per unit face value of debt issued.
The strategy of an issuer consists of the probability of soliciting a rating, and the probability
of selling the issues to the uninformed investors.
q3 q2 q1
s3 1 1− p 0
s2 0 p 0
s1 0 0 1
Table 2.1: Tiered noisy rating with inflation
The CRA’s objective is to maximize the total collected rating fees. To that end, the
CRA’s strategy is a choice of rating system and rating fee that maximizes its profit given
the strategies of firms and issuers. We focus on a specific class of rating technologies
summarized in table 2.1. This rating technology would always reveal type v1 issues, but
does not fully reveal type v2 and v3 issues. As will be discussed in more detail, with such a
rating technology, type v1 issuers do not solicit ratings. Therefore, this is effectively a two
tiered noisy rating technology with which employs rating inflation.
2.4. First Best Solution
Absent any information asymmetry, all issuers are able to sell their issues in the market for
their true values. Since we assumed firms which invest in the projects issue debts of unit
face value, the capital raised by one such firm is equal to q. Then the expected profit of
firm x, provided that all firms y < x have invested, is given by
qqR(qx)− qc− q =0
qR(qx)− c− 1 =0 (2.1)
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The left hand side of equation (2.1) is decreasing in x and is negative for large enough x by
assumption 2.1. Further, assumption 2.1 ensures that the left hand side of equation (2.1)
is strictly positive for x = 0. Therefore, there exists a unique xFB > 0 that solves equation
(2.1). Firm xFB > 0 is the firm which is indifferent between investing and not, provided
that all firms y < xFB invest. Another way to consider the first best solution is to look for
the aggregate investment in the projects IFB for which an extra unit of investment yields
an expected return of 0. Clearly the first best investment level, IFB, is equal to qxFB, and
therefore we can rewrite equation 2.1 as
qR(IFB) =c+ 1 (2.2)
Condition (2.2) equates the expected return of project IFB (the left hand side), to a firm’s
cost c of investing in a project plus the cost of capital, which is equal to 1 since investors
are competitive by assumption. Note that the first best solution is purely determined by
the projects expected return qR(.) and does not react to changes in q and R(.) as long as
the expected return remains constant. This is not the case for the equilibrium solution,
however, as it will be demonstrated in the next section. We will utilize this property of the
first best solution in our comparative statics analysis in later sections.
2.5. Equilibrium
We start by giving the formal definition of an equilibrium of the investment game.
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium of the investment game is a set of firms’ investment deci-
sions, the CRA’s and issuers’ strategies, and issue prices such that
• Given the strategy of the CRA and issuers, and prices, any profitable investment in
the projects is undertaken.
• Given firms’ investment decisions, issuers’ strategies, and prices, the CRA’s profit is
maximized.
37
• Provided the rating technology and fee, issuers maximize the capital raised.
• Given the investment decisions and the CRA and issuers’ strategies, uninformed in-
vestors’ prices for issues offered in the market is set to their corresponding expected
values. The expectations are calculated over uninformed investors’ beliefs, derived by
Bayes rule whenever possible.
We now proceed to derive an equilibrium of the investment game. We start by taking
firms’ investment decisions as given and solve the equilibrium of the rating sub-game. Note
that since the face value of debts issued by all investing firms is equal to 1, then the total
face value of debts issued by investing firms, m2, is equal to the measure of firms which
invest in the projects. Then in the rating sub-game, there are 3 issuer types v1, v2, v3 and
a total of m1,m2,m3 face value of each type of issue, respectively. This rating sub-game
2
has a unique equilibrium in which the rating system belongs to table 2.1, described by the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. There exists an equilibrium of the rating sub-game in which the CRA sets p =
δ(m3+m2)
m3+δm2
and φ = µ(1−δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 . Type v1 issuers do not solicit ratings. Market prices of
unrated issues, as well as s1 rated ones, are set to 0. Type v2 and v3 issuers do solicit ratings.
Conditional on rating s3, price of types v2 and v3 is set to U3 = (1 − δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 + δv3.
Conditional on rating s2, price of type v2 is set to v2. All issues are traded at set market
prices.
Ratings enable issuers to profit by selling their assets to uninformed investors who demand
lower rates (0 in our model) compared to informed investors. The CRA benefits by extract-
ing a fraction of these profits. Lemma 2.1 states that the optimal strategy of the CRA in the
rating sub-game is to choose a noisy rating system. The intuition behind this result is that
in order for the CRA to maximize profit, that is, to charge the highest possible φ, it needs
to choose rating precision p such that the willingness to pay for ratings of all the targeted
types are equal. In the equilibrium of Lemma 2.1, only types v2 and v3 are targeted. By
2This game is similar to the one studied in Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013)
38
assigning rating s3 to type v2 issues with some non zero probability, the willingness to pay
of these two types are made equal.
Since we made the assumption that firms have no capital of their own, rating fees must
naturally be paid by the proceedings of the issues. Consequently, the funds raised by all
issuers who solicit a rating must be at least as large as the rating fee, regardless of the
ratings issued. Among all the rated issue types, the smallest sale proceedings is equal to
v2, which is the outcome when a type v2 is rated s2. Therefore, imposing the constraint
v2 > φ ensures that all rated types are able to pay the rating fee. A sufficient condition
that ensures v2 > φ is
Lemma 2.2. µ(1− δ) < qv3 ⇒ v2 > φ
In making their investment decisions, firms take into account the impact of total investment
on the CRA’s choice of ratings. Suppose at first that no firm is investing in the projects,
that is m2 = 0, and consider the incentives of firm 0. Assumption 2.1 ensures that investing
in project 0 is profitable. To see this notice that if firm 0 decides to raise funds by selling
bonds to uninformed investors, the amount raised net of the rating fee is at least as large
as the amount offered by informed investors which is equal to δq. We can then conclude
that the measure of firms investing in the projects in equilibrium must be positive. Now
suppose all firms x < m2 have decided to invest while firms x > m2 have decided not to
invest and consider the incentives of firm m2. If firm m2 invests, the expected return per
unit of capital invested is equal to qR(I), where the aggregate investment of all firms in the
projects, I, is equal to
I =m2[pv2 + (1− p)U3 − φ]
=m2
[





where the last equality follows directly from Lemma 2.1. The cost of investing a unit by











(1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3+m2qm3+m2 + δq
For the measure of firms investing in the equilibrium outcome to be equal to m2, firm m2
must be indifferent between investing and not investing, that is
qR(I) =c+
q
(1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3+m2qm3+m2 + δq
. (2.4)
As m2 increases, the total amount invested in the projects, I, also increases which results in
a decrease in the expected return of firm m2’s investment. At the same time, the right hand
side of the indifference condition 2.4 is increasing in m2 since q = v2 < v3 by assumption.
As a result, there exist a unique m2 for which the indifference condition (2.4) is satisfied.
Proposition 2.1. The investment game has a unique equilibrium in which the CRA’s rating
technology belongs to table 2.1. The equilibrium measure of firms investing in the projects
mEq2 and the aggregate investment I










A comparison of the first best and equilibrium indifference conditions (2.2) and (2.4) reveals
how ratings can influence firms investment decisions through their impact on firms’ effective
cost of capital. In general, the cost of capital in equilibrium,
mEq2 q
IEq
will not be equal to 1.
Consequently, aggregate investment in equilibrium diverges from first best solution. For
a given project expected returns, however, we can find a q for which the two solutions
coincide.
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there exists a unique q∗ for which the equilibrium outcome and the first best coincide.
q∗ =




In this section, we explore the impact of changes in model parameters on the equilibrium
of the investment game. We start by analyzing the reaction of the equilibrium outcome to
changes in the riskiness of the projects, captured by parameter q.
Proposition 2.3. Keep the expected project returns constant. Then an increase in project
risk leads to larger total investment in the projects in equilibrium. In other words, subject
to qR(.) being constant, ∂∂q I
Eq < 0.
A decrease in q affects the equilibrium through different mechanisms. On the one hand,
when projects are more risky, the firms need to issue more bonds in order to keep the
aggregate investment constant. This is because the value of a bond of unit face value is
decreasing in its risk. By increasing the volume of their issues, firms will be paying more in
rating fees, which has a negative effect on the firms’ cost of capital. On the other hand, since
the strategy of the CRA involves equating the willingness to pay for ratings of all rated
types, a riskier bond is traded, on average, at a higher premium. This effect effectively
reduced firms’ cost of capital. By Proposition 2.3, the second force is dominant. Then
firms’ effective cost of capital is decreasing in q, which in turn induces higher aggregate
investment by the firms.
A different perspective into Proposition 2.3 can be gained by considering a set of model
parameters for which the equilibrium aggregate investment is equal to first best, that is
IEq = IFB. Since we are keeping the projects’ expected returns constant, changing q does
not change the first best solution. The equilibrium aggregate investment, on the other hand,
is a function of q which translates to over or under investments, depending on the direction
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of change in q.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that the equilibrium outcome coincides with first best, IEq = IFB.
Then subject to the expected return being constant, an increase in project risk (decrease in
q) leads to over investment. Inversely, a decrease in risk is followed by under investment.
From another point of view, Proposition 2.3 suggests that all else being equal, riskier
projects are more attractive to the firms. In other words, credit ratings can induce ex-
cessive risk taking by firms.
Next, we fix the return function R(.) and look at the effect of changes in risk q. Obviously,
a decrease in q translates into a decrease in expected return which in turn leads to smaller
equilibrium aggregate investment. However, since the aggregate investment in first best also
drops as q decreases, it is not immediately clear how a change in risk impacts efficiency of the
equilibrium outcome. For that reason, we consider the case in which equilibrium solution
and first best coincide. We then apply a risk shock that reduces the market value of all
issue types, while maintaining their relative values. The following proposition establishes
the effect of such a risk shock.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the equilibrium solution and first best coincide and fix the
ratio v3q . Then provided that R(x) >
IFB
x R(I
FB), a shock to q results in the new equilibrium
aggregate investment to fall below the new first best.
Note that we only require condition R(x) > I
FB
x R(I
FB) to hold locally, around the first
best solution. Proposition 2.4 states that for such a return curve, a risk shock causes under
investment in equilibrium. This suggests that among other factors, ratings can contribute
to inefficient fall in aggregate investment, following a financial crisis.




As the CRA’s market power, that is µ increases, the CRA would charge higher fee, which
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in effect increases firm’s cost of capital, which in turn reduces aggregate investment in the
projects. This result is interesting in that it has different implications regarding efficiency,
depending on the macro environment. During expansions in which over investment is the
likely market inefficiency, a more dominant CRA is a correcting force in that it curbs firms’
incentives to invest and therefore improves efficiency. On the other hand, in the after math
of a financial crisis where firms are prone to under invest, a dominant CRA is an impediment
to recovery, since it further disincentivizes already under investing firms.
Unlike µ, increasing δ unambiguously improves efficiency. Recall that δ is effectively the
factor by which informed investors discount the issuers’ assets. As δ increases, informed
investors’ price for the issues tends to their true values. Given the fact that firms always
have the option to borrow from informed investors, the CRA’s reaction to an increase in δ
is to improve rating precision and reduce rating fee, as evident from Lemma 2.1. In short,
higher δ leads to firms’ effective cost of capital to be closer to their fair value of 1, which
translates into higher efficiency. In the limit where δ = 1, a firm’s raised capital is equal to
the expected value of the bonds it issues, which means the equilibrium solution is the first
best.
Proposition 2.6. Efficiency is increasing in δ.
In our model, we made the assumption that investors in the bond market are uninformed.
We can now discuss qualitatively the effect of relaxing this assumption on equilibrium and
efficiency. Kartasheva and Yilmaz (2013) show that when informed speculators are present
together with uninformed investors, the winner’s curse phenomenon prompts the CRA to
increase rating precision in order to limit the informed speculators’ information rent. In
our model, an increase in rating precision would effectively increase firms’ cost of capital,
and in turn, reduce their incentives to invest. In other words, informed speculation would
reduce aggregate investment in our model. During expansion periods, this mechanism has
the potential to reduce firms’ over investment and improve efficiency. However, our model
suggests that informed speculators can hurt recovery during recessions due to their negative
43
influence on firms’ incentives to invest.
Proposition 2.7. Informed speculation in the bond market reduces aggregate investment.
2.7. Conclusion
In this work, we presented a framework to study whether and how ratings can affect firms
investment decisions. We then established an equilibrium of the game and used the first best
solution to measure the efficiency of the equilibrium solution. We derived the conditions
under which the equilibrium solution is efficient and analyzed the impact of changes in
parameters of the model on efficiency. Among others, our results suggest that ratings can
incentivize firms to choose riskier investment when faced with ones with identical expected
returns. We also showed that when there is a shock to the economy that effects investment




Proof of lemma 1.1. First note that in the equilibrium of the continuation game, the market
prices of s2 and s3 rated securities must be strictly higher than the price of s1 rated securities,
since s1 rating reveals that the security belongs to the lowest tier with probability 1. The
same logic requires s3 rated securities to be prices at least as high as s2 rated ones.
Now consider a security type v that does not belong to the set A = {vp, v1, v2, v3}. Then
the security must contain at least two asset types in the set A, where at least one type is
either v2 or v3. Suppose v is made up of b units of type vp and a units of type v2. Clearly,
v receives rating s1 by the CRA. Now consider the following decomposition of v into two
new securities:1) type v′ security made of b units of type vp and a−  units of type v2, and
2)  units of type v2. Clearly, v
′ is also rated s1, while type v2 is rated either s2 or s3. As a
result, market price of type v is strictly lower than the aggregate price of the decomposed
version. Since the decomposition is costless, it is dominating.
A similar argument can be used for a security that is part vp type and part v3 type. It
then follows that a dominating strategy by the issuers is to include in their portfolios only
security types that match the rating tier cutoffs.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. First notice that since the total gain from trade is not a function
of the CRA or issuer’s actions, and in all cases the CRA extracts the maximum possible
fraction of the total gain from trade, the CRA’s strategy is clearly dominating. It remains
to show that the strategies of the issuers constitute best responses.
Suppose c ≥ (1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 . This implies that given φ = µ(1− δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 and
p = δ(m3+m2)m3+δm2 , issuer 3 prefers to issue its endowment of type 3 asset without bundling it
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with the production asset. To see this notice that
U3 − φ ≥(1 + λ)[p22v2 + (1− p22U3)]− λc− (1 + λ)φ












=(1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3 +m2v2
m3 +m2
.
Next, suppose (1−δ)(1−µ)(m3v3+m2v2)m3+m2+λ3m3 < c < (1 − µ)(1 − δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 . Following the above
logic, not bundling is not an equilibrium. Then type v3 bundles fraction α of his asset with
λ3m3 units of the production asset. For this to constitute an equilibrium, issuer v3 must
be indifferent between 1) soliciting a rating and issuing a unit of vanilla type v3 and 2)
packaging that with the production asset, soliciting a rating for the package, and issuing
the package in the market. This is the case iff
U3 − φ =(1 + λ3)[pv2 + (1− p)U3]− (1 + λ3)φ− λ3c
⇔ λ3(φ+ c) =(1 + λ3)[pv2 + (1− p)U3]− U3.
Also, for the CRA to extract the maximum possible fraction of the trade surplus, type v2
and v3 assets must have equal wilingness to pay for the rating.
(U3 − δv3) =([pv2 + (1− p)U3]− δv2).
Finally, φ = µ(U3 − δv3). The solution to the above 3 linear equations in 3 unknowns
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follows.


















[pv2 + (1− p)U3]− δv2 =φ
µ
[pv2 + (1− p)(φ
µ




+ δv3] =δ(v3 − v2)
p =
δ(v3 − v2)
δv3 − v2 + φµ
=
δ(v3 − v2)








1− µ + δv3.
Now we can use the above to solve for α. We can write U3 as a function of α according to
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the following.









m3(1− α)v3 + (1− p)(m2 + α(1 + λ3)m3)v2
m3(1− α) + (1− p)(m2 + α(1 + λ3)m3) .
Rearranging the terms and we have
U3 − v2
v3 − U3 =
m3(1− α)
(1− p)(m2 + α(1 + λ3)m3)
(1− p)U3 − v2
v3 − U3 =
m3(1− α)
(m2 + α(1 + λ3)m3)
−(1− δ)(1− µ)v2 + c
(1− µ)(1− δ)v3 − c =
m3(1− α)
(m2 + α(1 + λ3)m3)
it immediately follows that
m3[(1− µ)(1− δ)v3 − c] +m2[(1− µ)(1− δ)v2 − c]
=αm3[(1− µ)(1− δ)v3 − c− (1− µ)(1− δ)(1 + λ3)v2 + (1 + λ3)c],
which, noting that (1 + λ3)v2 = v3, simplifies to
αλ3m3c =(1− δ)(1− µ)(m3v3 +m2v2)− c(m3 +m2)
α =
(1− δ)(1− µ)(m3v3 +m2v2)− c(m3 +m2)
λ3m3c
Finally, if c ≤ (1−δ)(1−µ)(m3v3+m2v2)m3+m2+λ3m3 , we need to show that p = 0 and α = 1 constitute an
equilibrium strategy. If p = 0 and α = 1, then U3 = v2 and φ = µ(1 − δ)v2. We need to
show that type v3 prefers bundling a unit of type v3 asset with the production asset over
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offering it as a vanilla type v3 asset. This is true if
(1 + λ3)v2 − (1 + λ3)φ− λ3c ≥v2 − φ
v2(1− µ(1− δ)) ≥c
which holds if
(1− δ)(1− µ)(m3v3 +m2v2)
m3 +m2 + λ3m3
≤v2(1− µ(1− δ))
(1− δ)(1− µ)(m3v3 +m2v2) ≤(1− µ(1− δ))(m3v3 +m2v2)
(1− δ)(1− µ) ≤(1− µ(1− δ))
0 ≤δ.
Also, we need to show that type v3 issuer prefers soliciting a rating over its assets reservation
value. This is the case if
(1 + λ3)v2 − (1 + λ3)φ− λ3c ≥δv3
v3(1− µ(1− δ))− λ3c ≥δv3
(1− µ)(1− δ)v3 ≥λ3c,
which is true if
(1− µ)(1− δ)v3
λ3
≥(1− δ)(1− µ)(m3v3 +m2v2)




m3 +m2 + λ3m3
m3v3 +m2v3 + λ3m3v3 ≥λ3m3v3 +m2(v3 − v2)
m3v3 +m2v2 ≥0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2. Proposition 1.1 established that the CRA extracts fraction µ of
the trade surplus in equilibrium which immediately yields piCRA. Next,
pi2
m2












The rest immediately follows from Proposition 1.1 by substituting for φ. Finally, for c > c,
pi3
m3












The rest follows immediately by substituting for φ from Proposition 1.1. For c ≤ c,
pi3
m3




=(1− δ)v3 − µ(1− δ)v3 − cv3 − v2
v2
=(1− µ)(1− δ)v3 − cv3 − v2
v2
.
Lemma A.1. In any equilibrium of the production game the following must hold.
1. Issuers 2 and 3 sell all their assets in the market. All bundles containing type v2 or
v3 assets are rated.
2. The CRA extracts fraction µ of the gain from trade of any rated bundle.
3. The profit of the CRA is µ(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2).
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Proof of lemma A.1. First observe that since the gain from trade of the production asset is
0, regardless of the amount of production asset present in the market, total gain from trade
to be made is given by
(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2). (A.1)
Since by assumption, the CRA can extract at most a fraction µ of the gain from any trade,
the profit of the CRA in any equilibrium of the production game is bounded from above
by the product of µ and (A.1). Finally, as established by Proposition 1.1, there exist’s an
equilibrium in which the profit of the CRA is equal to the upper bound µ(1−δ)(m3v3+m2v2)
established here. This concludes the argument.





For c ≥ c and c ≤ c, α is equal to 0 and 1, respectively, for which mp is immediately derived.
For c < c < c, we substitute for α from Proposition 1.1, and we have
mp =
(1− δ)(1− µ)(m3v3 +m2v2)− c(m3 +m2)
c
.
Lemma A.2. Suppose a bundle with type v is rated and traded in an equilibrium of the





Proof of lemma A.2. The average gain from trade of a unit of the bundle is U − δv. Then
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by lemma A.1 we have




Proof of Proposition 1.4. First note that since the production asset generates no gain from
trade, the total gain from trade in any equilibrium is upper bounded by (1−δ)(m3v3+m2v2).
Next, since the CRA can extract at most fraction µ of the gain from any trade, the CRA’s
profit cannot exceed the product of the maximum total gain from trade and fraction µ, or
µ(1 − δ)(m3v3 + m2v2). We already established an equilibrium in which the CRA’s profit
reaches the above upper bound. Consequently, in any equilibrium of the game, the profit
of the CRA must be equal to
µ(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2). (A.2)
Now consider any equilibrium of the game in which mp units of the production asset is
produced. For the CRA’s profit to be equal to (A.2), all type v2 and v3 assets must
be traded. Further, since the production technology has negative NPV, any units of the





Now consider the equilibrium strategy of issuer 3. Observe that the average type of issuer
3’s equilibrium portfolio must be larger than v2, otherwise, mp ≥ m3λ3 and we are done.
Then there must exist a bundle b1 in that portfolio whose unit value, vˆ3, is strictly above
v2. Then for each unit of type 3 asset in b1, there are λˆ1 =
v3−vˆ3
vˆ3
units of production asset.
Now take a look at a unit of type v3 asset in b. Issuer 3’s profit for a unit of type v3 asset
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]− λˆ1c− (1 + λˆ1)φ




Now consider an arbitrary type vˆ2 ≤ v2 bundle in the portfolio of issuer 2. Issuer 3 can
deviate from equilibrium action by replacing bundle b1 with a type vˆ2 bundle b2, soliciting
a rating for b2 and trading b2 in the market. To form bundle b2, issuer 3 can simply group
a unit of type v3 with λˆ2 =
v3−vˆ2
vˆ2
of the production asset. Issuer 3’s profit from deviation







]− λˆ2c− (1 + λˆ2)φ




Equilibrium requires that the above deviation not be profitable. Thus the following must
be true.
δv3 + (1 + λˆ2)φ
1− µ
µ
− λˆ2c ≤ δv3 + (1 + λˆ1)φ1− µ
µ
− λˆ1c,










(1− µ)(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2)
c
≤m3 +m2 +mp
(1− µ)(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2)
c
− (m3 +m2) ≤mp.
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Proof of Proposition 1.5. By definition, c = (1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 which is decreasing in









Since the above set of constraints does not involve c, all that remains to select an appropriate
c that satisfies (1.15).
Lemma A.3. The following is true for U3 and pf .
U3 =(1− pf )v3 + pfv2
Proof of lemma A.3. By definition
U3 =Pr(v3|s3)v3 + Pr(v2|s3)
=(1− pf )v3 + pfv2,
where that last line follows directly from the definition of pf .
Proof of Proposition 1.6. By Proposition 1.1, rating precision is equal to p = δ(v3−v2)δv3−v2+ c1−µ ,
which is clearly decreasing in c.
Next, lemma A.3 and the assumption v3 > v2 imply that pf is decreasing in U3. From
Proposition 1.1, U3 =
c
1−µ + δv3. Then since U3 is increasing in c, then pf must be
decreasing in the same.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. Since lemma A.3 and the fact that v3 > v2 imply that pf is
decreasing in U3, it suffices to show that U3 is increasing in µ. By Proposition 1.1, U3 =
c
1−µ + δv3, which is increasing in µ and therefore the first part of the Proposition is proved.
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Next, by Proposition 1.3, mpc = (1 − δ)(1 − µ)(m3v3 + m2v2) − c(m3 + m2), which is
decreasing in µ.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. The first claim follows from lemma A.3 and the fact that U3 =
c





















The term m3v3+m2v2m3+m2 represent the average quality of type v3 and v2 assets, which is increas-






Proof of Lemma 2.1. We start by examining the incentives of the issuers. The profit of type
v1 issuers in the equilibrium candidate is equal to 0. If type v1 issuers deviate by soliciting
ratings, their types are revealed and their asset is priced 0. In addition they must pay the
rating fee. The other deviation is to sell the issues to informed investors in which case their
profit is still 0. Therefore, there are no profitable deviations for type v1.
For type v2, the profit by following equilibrium candidate is equal to
pv2 + (1− p)U3 − φ =(1− δ)m3v3 +m2v2
m3 +m2
+ δv2 − φ




A deviation by type v2 either involves selling to informed investors for δv2, or selling to
uninformed investors without soliciting a rating for 0. Clearly none is profitable.
Finally, type v3’s equilibrium candidate profit is given by




A deviation by type v3 is either selling to informed investors for δv3 or selling the issues
unrated for 0, neither profitable.
Next, consider the incentives of the CRA. The total value of issuers’ assets is equal to m3v3+
m2v2, which is also what they are collectively traded for if they are rated and offered to
uninformed investors. Alternatively, ff issuers sell to informed investors, their assets are sold
for δ(m3v3+m2v2). Then the ratings generate a trade surplus equal to (1−δ)(m3v3+m2v2).
By assumption, the CRA can charge at most fraction µ of surplus generated by ratings in
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any trade. Therefore, the profit of the CRA cannot exceed µ(1 − δ)(m3v3 + m2v2). The
CRA’s profit in the equilibrium candidate is equal to (m3 +m2)φ = µ(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2v2).
Therefore there are no profitable deviations for the CRA.
Finally, we need to confirm that φ does not exceed any rated type’s willingness to pay.
µ(U3 − δv3) =µ(1− δ)m3v3 +m2v2
m3 +m2
=µ[pv2 + (1− p)U3 − δv2]
=φ.




µ(1− δ)(m3v3 +m2q) <(m3 +m2)q
Since q < v3, A sufficient condition that guarantees the above inequality is that
µ(1− δ)v3 <q.
















































⇒ m2 = m3






(1− µ)m3v3 − µIFB







































(1− µ) (1 + m3v3
IFB
)− 1
(1− µ) (IFB +m3v3)− IFB <(1− µ)m3v3
−µIFB <0,
which is always true.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Recall that the indifference condition for the equilibrium solution
is given by the equation
qR(I) =c+
q






Keep I constant. Then by Lemma B.2, an increase in q leads to an increase in the right
hand side of the indifference condition. To reestablish the indifference condition then the
aggregate investment I must decrease since the left hand side is decreasing in I.
Lemma B.1. The solution to the equation I = m2
[






2q((1− µ)(1− δ) + δ)
{
I − [(1− µ)(1− δ)m3v3 + δm3q]
+
√











Define α = (1− µ)(1− δ) and we solve for m2 as a function of I and q.
I(m3 +m2) =m2[α(m3v3 +m2q) + δ(m3 +m2)q]
Rearranging the terms
m22[(α+ δ)q] +m2[αm3v3 + δm3q − I]−m3I =0
The above quadratic equation has a positive and a negative solution. The positive solution
is
m2 =
I − (αm3v3 + δm3q) +
√
[I − (αm3v3 + δm3q)]2 + 4(α+ δ)Im3q
2q(α+ δ)
Lemma B.2. Subject to I being constant, ∂∂qm2q > 0.
Proof. Define α = (1− µ)(1− δ) and x = m3q. Then by Lemma B.1, we have
m2q =
I − (αm3v3 + δm3q) +
√
[I − (αm3v3 + δm3q)]2 + 4(α+ δ)Im3q
2(α+ δ)
=
I − (αm3v3 + δx) +
√
[I − (αm3v3 + δx)]2 + 4(α+ δ)Ix
2(α+ δ)
Since the denominator is constant and positive, the derivative of m2q with respect to q has
60
the same sign as the derivative of f(x) = 2(α+ δ)m2q.
f ′(x) >0
⇔ [I − (αm3v3 + δx)](−δ) + 2(α+ δ)I√
[I − (αm3v3 + δx)]2 + 4(α+ δ)Ix
>δ
⇔ [I − (αm3v3 + δx)](−δ) + 2(α+ δ)I >δ
√
[I − (αm3v3 + δx)]2 + 4(α+ δ)Ix
⇔ {[I − (αm3v3 + δx)](−δ) + 2(α+ δ)I}2 >δ2[I − (αm3v3 + δx)]2 + 4δ2(α+ δ)Ix
where the last line follows since both sides of the inequality are positive.
f ′(x) > 0
⇔δ2[I − (αm3v3 + δx)]2 + 4(α2 + δ2 + 2αδ)I2 + 4[I − (αm3v3 + δx)](−δ)(α+ δ)I
> δ2[I − (αm3v3 + δx)]2 + 4δ2(α+ δ)Ix
⇔4(α2 + δ2 + 2αδ)I2 + 4[I − (αm3v3 + δx)](−δ)(α+ δ)I
> 4δ2(α+ δ)Ix
⇔(α2 + δ2 + 2αδ)I2 + [I − (αm3v3 + δx)](−δ)(α+ δ)I
> δ2(α+ δ)Ix
⇔(α2 + δ2 + 2αδ)I2 + (−δ2 − αδ)I2 + δ(α+ δ)(αm3v3 + δx)I
> δ2(α+ δ)Ix
⇔(α2 + αδ)I2 + αδ(α+ δ)m3v3I
> 0.
Proof of proposition 2.4. Let q∗ be the success probability for which the equilibrium solution
is identical to the first best solution and denote the solution by m∗2, IFB. The indifference
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Now consider a shock to the value of issues in the form of v′3 = av3, and q′ = aq. The new
























































where we used the assumption R(I) > I
FB
I R(I




I′ , then it must be the case that I
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